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Multi Attacker Collision Analysis in MANETs 
using Conditional Likilihood 
Nitta Rajkiran 
Abstract - Mobile ad hoc networks will aim to provide services 
to the wireless network without depending on any fixed 
infrastructure There are basically two approaches to motivate 
players: 1) by denying service to misbehaving players by 
means of a reputation mechanism or 2) by remunerating 
honest players, using for example a micropayment scheme. In 
these works, malicious players are modelled as never 
cooperative, without any further sophistication, since their 
main focus was discouraging selfish players. There is no 
degree of selfishness that can approximate the behaviour of 
malicious players. This work will focus on multi-attacker 
collusion in the regular/malicious player game. The Proposed 
System also model the regular/malicious player game as a 
multistage dynamic Bayesian signalling game to find the 
optimal strategy of regular and malicious players. Apart from 
that utility function, degree of selfishness of a player and 
degree of uncertainty are also considered. 
Keywords :  bayesian signaling game, game theory, 
mobile ad hoc networks (MOBILE AD HOC 
NETWORKS), mobility, reputation systems, sequential 
rationality, uncertainty. 
I. Introduction 
anets is the self organizing nature without  
relaying on any fixed infrastructure. The 
beautiful nature of the mantes is their topology 
is dynamic. They do not fallow any fixed topology in 
nature. As we know that in the network their two kinds of 
nodes. Malicious nodes other are regular. The malicious 
nodes always tend to attack other nodes and alter the 
data or waste the resources. We can consider this as a 
wrestling scenario between the two. There are so many 
approaches to find the malicious nodes. But we have 
taken the game theory to find the malicious nodes 
because game theory is the study of wrestling between 
the nodes. In the game theory everything is probality 
based. We shall be considering the scenario between 
the two players as a game. At the time of playing the 
game we usually intend to know strategy of other player. 
But we always land up in half knowledge about the other 
player i.e. the strategy of the opposite player is not 
completely known, that concept is called as baysion 
signalling game. At the time of playing we keep 
mentoring other players, that concept is know is 
neighbouring monitoring. As we malicious nodes always 
tend to attack and keep fleeing to avoid punishment. So 
what it does is it goes to the other network and attack or  
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cooperate with the other nodes at some point i.e. is the 
threshold point the malicious nodes get caught. Normal 
players will aim to focus with their resources on 
cooperating with regular nodes and do not accept the 
requests of from suspicious neighbouring and keep 
reporting when the neighbouring is considered to be 
malicious.  Both regular and malicious nodes’ best 
responses are guided by threats about certain reactions 
from other players. [1] Such threats are dependent on 
their current beliefs. [1] The regular node sets a 
reputation threshold and judges other nodes’ types 
based on the evaluated belief and this threshold. [1] The 
malicious node continuously evaluates the risk, which is 
decided by the possibility that a regular node would 
choose to report under current conditions. [1] On the 
basis of the risk and expected fleeing cost, the 
malicious node makes a decision on fleeing. [1] The 
contributions of this paper are as follows: 1) We had 
theorized a Bayesian game framework to understand 
and study the strategy of regular and malicious nodes in 
MANETs; 2) we will be simulating it for multiple and 
single attacker for regular nodes to report and malicious 
nodes to flee [1].  
II. Related Work 
In the existing work most of the game theory is 
based on single attacker and multiple individual 
attacker. So in general those attackers will not co- 
operate with each other so the strategy of every attacker 
is independent of other. In the existing work most of the 
game theory is based on single attacker and multiple 
attacker. So in general those attackers will not co- 
operate with each other so the strategy of every attacker 
is independent of other. The payoff for players to 
cooperate are analyzed and presented in [1]–[3]. Well, 
in this works, malicious players are structured as never 
cooperative, since there main motive is to discouraging 
players which are stingy. As we know that the good 
players’ behaviour in [5] is simple, and it fails to 
consider the possibility that an attacker can choose 
different attack frequencies toward different opponents 
depending upon the requirement [26]. There can be no 
degree of stingy that can approximate the attitude of 
malicious players. In this, we have modelled the 
malicious players with their own functions of utility, 
which will be different from regular players. In other 
sense, we will assume that malicious players are also 
rational concerning their goals.  
M 
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In recent works we studied the payoff for 
malicious players and simulated their behaviour more 
rationally. In [4], Liu et al. present a general incentive-
based method to model the attackers’ intents, 
objectives, and strategies. In [5], Theodorakopoulos and 
Baras further study the payoff of the malicious players 
and identify the influence of the network topology. 
We consider malicious players, making the 
malicious and regular players’ game in this paper more 
and more interesting. Game theory [6] is a powerful tool 
in modelling interactions among self-interested players 
and predicting their choice of strategies [7]–[10]. 
Therefore, wireless ad hoc networks [11]–[13] are more 
often studied using game theory [26]. The equilibrium of 
the contention window game is studied in [13] [26]. In 
the previous work they have simulated for single 
attacker using the PBE strategy with other strategy and 
found that PBE works much better compared to other. 
But in the current work we have taken same PBE 
strategy for multiple attackers and found that belief, 
disbelief and uncertainty is much efficient to find the 
malicious nodes by comparing with single attacker [26]. 
III. Proposed Model 
Some how this type of attacker model may not 
create to serious theats in the data transmission so this 
will give flexi able sometimes equal probality to attack or 
flee. Because of probality it is not possible to predict the 
strategy of the attacker. If the attacker drops problity is 
equal to overcome these limitations there is a need to 
introduce cryptographic technique as well as 
considerations of multiple collisions attackers model. 
To specify the collision attacker we need to 
consider conditional probity as well as lo likili hood of 
the player’s strategy. According the the conditional 
probility we can verify the strategy of a player for given 
class where class indicates the evidence already we 
having so there reprentation is given by P(x|c). In the 
above representation x specifies strategy of current 
player and c represents the total strategic the game. 
Likili hood specifies for given behaviour to a given class. 
In this paper we are also applying condition probility and 
likilihood between players also by applying the condition 
probility between the two players specifies what the level 
of support coming from other player is. Based on this 
assumption we can divide the player into two groups 1) 
specifies high transmission error rate and other group 
specifies high packet delivery ratio. Based on the 
probility in the error transmission group we can also say 
that those players are playing the game with co-
operation. This will be treated as collision attacker with 
respect to the high transmission error group. To achieve 
this there is need to monitor and record the activates of 
each players throughout the game. If the player is a new 
comer in the game than is a need to find the likilihood of 
the player. Likili hood calculate involves behaviour of the 
player so that there is a need to verify the behaviour 
against the available strategy. 
Apart from the pure probility theory there is a 
need to provide cryptographic solution for path security. 
We need to incorporate digital signature for the strategy 
of a every player as well as digital signature for the 
control packets. Every time we are reading route request 
and route reply we need to verify the signature of those 
packets. This very much useful when the attackers are 
try to introduce wormhole attack in the given path. 
a) Neighbour Observing   
By exploring the nature of broadcast 
intercommunication in wireless network, players will 
track the outgoing of packets from one-hop neighbours 
through passive observation. But, a player will able to 
differentiate whether a failure in communication is 
caused by its opposite player A or D[26]. Therefore, an 
detail observation will be classified as either a detected 
C or a detected A/D. The correspond discrete variable 
namely α for detected C and β for detected A/D, will be 
incremented as shown in Fig. 1(b). This mechanism is 
called neighbour monitoring [24] [26]. In practical 
MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKs, the detection process 
has challenges. First, the malicious player can disguise 
itself. Second, the unreliability and the wireless 
channelizes bring more uncertain to the observing to the 
process [26]. The schemes which ignore the noise in the 
observation may not be practical in the actual wireless 
intercommunication. We assume that the bugs in the 
observation will occur with low probability. Else it would 
be impossible to distinguish a malicious player by 
Neighbour observing.  
b) Decision Reckon 
We analyze the MOBILE AD HOC NETWORK to 
find the best decision rules and action by using the 
dynamic Bayesian game framework Fig. 1(b) shows the 
process of regular and malicious players to take 
decision. The regular player obtains feedback from its 
neighbor observing and calculates the belief and 
sufficiency of evidence toward the opposite player 
based on the α and β values. It follow threshold rules to 
decide whether to report or not. If not the regular player 
will choose C with a probability p, which is calculated 
based on its belief [26]. The malicious player calculates 
the risk of being caught. It follows rule to decide whether 
to flee or not depending on the threshold. If else, the 
malicious player chooses A with a probability φ. 
c) Bayesian Signalling Game 
A signaling game is a dynamic, Bayesian game 
with two players, the sender (S) and the receiver (R). The 
sender has a certain type, t, which is given by nature.[1] 
(The sender observes his own type while the receiver 
does not know the type of the sender.[1] Based on his 
knowledge of his own type, the sender chooses to send 
a message from a set of possible messages M = {m1, 
  
  
 
   
 
  
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
  
  
  
 V
ol
um
e 
X
III
  
Is
su
e 
III
  
V
er
sio
n 
I 
2
  
 
(
DDDD
)
© 2013   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
Y
e
a
r
01
3
2
  
 
   
 
  28
E
Multi Attacker Collision Analysis in MANETs using Conditional likilihood
 The equilibrium concept that is relevant for 
signaling games is Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium is a refinement of Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium, which is an extension of Nash equilibrium to 
games of incomplete information. Perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium is the equilibrium concept relevant for 
dynamic games of incomplete information) [1] [26]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
 
                                                      
               
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  1(b)  
By seeing the above block diagram we can find 
the flow of the game. In the above diagram first the 
regular node decides to cooperate or not  if it fails to do 
so Beta value will be incremented else alpha value will 
be incremented if it alpha it will calculate the trust if the 
threshold is reached it will be reporting else the process 
keeps continuing else if it is a malicious nodes it will 
tracks the regular node trust and evaluate the risk of 
being caught and it estimates the risk i.e. if the risk is 
greater than flee cost than it will flee else it will attack. at 
last end of the game. 
  
The PBE of this game describes the optimal 
decision rules for both regular and malicious players 
and reveals the connection between the best strategy 
profile and the cost and gain of individual strategies 
[26]. From the discussion, we can summarize player j’s 
PBE strategy σ*j as strategy profile 1. The regular type 
player i has the same PBE strategy profile as j, and the 
PBE strategy σ*i of malicious-type player i is listed as 
strategy profile [26]. 
V. Experimental Results and Analysis 
All proposed have been implemented and 
compared on a discrete event simulator. All simulations 
are conducted in randomly generated MOBILE AD HOC 
NETWORKs. The regular player can track its neighbor’s 
outgoing packets by neighbour monitoring. We have 
taken 10 players to 50 players and made 10 iterations 
for each player are randomly placed in a 900 m ×900 m 
region which is evenly divided into clusters. The 
transmission range is 50 m. Any two players within the 
same cluster are considered as neighbours. Players 
follow the cluster based mobility model [25]. It shows 
this mobility model for players in Fig. 1(a). It is the 
probability that regular players in cluster Cx  will move to 
cluster  Cy. The  minimum  number  of  malicious 
players is 1. 
 
PBE startgy (Existing system) 
Single attacker Multi attacker
 
Belief  Disbelief
 Belief
 Disbelief 
Comparison of results Comparison of results 
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Multi Attacker Collision Analysis in MANETs using Conditional likilihood
m2, m3,..., mj} [1]. The receiver observes the message 
but not the type of the sender. Then the receiver 
chooses an action from a set of feasible actions A = 
{a1, a2, a3,...., ak}. The two players receive payoffs 
dependent on the sender's type, the message chosen 
by the sender and the action chosen by the receiver. A 
related game is a screening game where rather than 
choosing an action based on a signal, the receiver gives 
the sender proposals based on the type of the sender, 
which the sender has some control over [1] [26].
VI. Comparison with Previous Schemes 
In this section, we compare the performance of 
the proposed scheme with those for the previous 
schemes, namely Yinying   Yang    [25], Jie Wu [25]. The  
comprations are made with  single  attacker  vs  multiple   
attackers
 
and found the results were much better with 
multiple attackers
 
than single attacker as shown in the 
table 2 the proposed approach of multiple attackers
 
is 
compared with previous approaches.
 
 
 
                 
     
Table 1
 
                                                              
Figure
 
2
 
:
 
Shows the comparations with single attacker
 
with
  
                                              
  
                                                                                      
multi-attacker
 
The values in the above table taken by 
considering the belief system of multi attacker and 
single attacker and found that graph 3 for belief system 
for multi attacker increases but the graph for the single 
attacker slowly decreasing with respect of nodes and 
the
 
graph is
 
plotted
 
which is show in the fig
 
2.
 
 
         
Table 2
 
                                            
                  
          
 
Figure
 
3
 
:
 
Shows the comparations of disbelief of single 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
attacker with respect multiattacker
 
In the figure 3 it shows the comparations of 
disbelief of single attacker with multi attacker and found 
that disbelief keeps increasing and decreasing.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No of 
nodes
 
Belief wrt multi-
attacker
 
Belief wrt 
single attacker
 
10
 
0.222
 
0.634
 
20
 
0.852
 
0.919
 
30
 
0.222
 
0.222
 
40
 
0.852
 
0.936
 
50
 
0.412
 
0.412
 
60
 
0.833
 
0.852
 
70
 
0.412
 
0.412
 
80
 
0.833
 
0.852
 
90
 
0.222
 
0.412
 
100
 
0.833
 
0.747
 
No of 
nodes 
Disbelief Belief 
wrt multi-attacker 
Disbelief Belief wrt 
single-attacker 
10 0.111 0.111 
20 0.137 0.137 
30 0.111 0.111 
40 0.137 0.126 
50 0.137 0.111 
60 0.312 0.137 
70 0.126 0.111 
80 0.412 0.137 
90 0.111 0.111 
100 0.137 0.216 
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Screen Shots 
 
The above pic its shows the screen shots for 100 nodes simulated on the JNS 
 
In the above screen shots it shows the values taken at the time of iteration
VII.
 
onclusion
 
The proposed system is simulated in java 
network animator and found that the results were good 
and efficient compared to the previous approach. In this 
paper, there is need to enhance the by introducing 
probality decision tree classification of data mining to 
predict behaviour of the players to increase the 
accuracy.
 
References Références Referencias
 
1.
 
Blanc, Y. Liu, and A. Vahdat, “Designing incentives 
for peer-to-peer routing,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM,
 
2005, pp. 374–385.
 
2.
 
L. Buttyan and J. Hubaux, “Stimulating cooperation 
in self-organizing mobile ad hoc networks,” ACM 
Mobile  
 
Netw.   Appl.,   vol. 8,   no. 5,   pp. 579–592, 
 
Oct. 2003.
 
3. M. Felegyhazi, J. Hubaux, and L. Buttyan, “Nash 
equilibria of packet forwarding strategies in wireless 
ad hoc networks,” IEEE Trans. Mobile Comput., vol. 
5, no. 5, pp. 463–476, May 2006. 
4. P. Liu, W. Zang, and M. Yu, “Incentive-based 
modeling and inference of attacker intent, objectives 
and strategies,” ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur., vol. 8, 
no. 1, pp. 78–118, Feb. 2005. 
5. G. Theodorakopoulos and J. Baras, “Malicious 
users in unstructured networks,” in Proc. IEEE 
INFOCOM, 2007, pp. 884–891. 
6. D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991. 
7. R. Axelrod and W. Hamilton, “The evolution of 
cooperation,” Science, vol. 211, no. 4489, pp. 1390–
1396, Mar. 1981. 
8. P. Nuggehalli, M. Sarkar, K. Kulkarni, and R. Rao, “A 
game-theoretic analysis of QoS in wireless MAC,” in 
Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2008, pp. 1903–1911. 
© 2013   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
  
  
  
 V
ol
um
e 
X
III
  
Is
su
e 
III
  
V
er
sio
n 
I 
  
  
 
  
31
  
 
(
DDDD DDDD
)
Y
e
a
r
01
3
2
E
Multi Attacker Collision Analysis in MANETs using Conditional likilihood
C
9. S. Ng and W. Seah, “Game-theoretic model for 
collaborative protocols in selfish, tariff-free, multihop 
wireless networks,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2008, 
pp. 216–220. 
10. S. Sarkar, E. Altman, R. El-Azouzi, and Y. Hayel, 
“Information concealing games,” in Proc. IEEE 
INFOCOM, 2008, pp. 2119–2127. 
11. X. Liu, G. Noubir, R. Sundaram, and S. Tan, 
“SPREAD: Foiling smart jammers using multi-layer 
agility,”    in   Proc.   IEEE    INFOCOM,   2007,   pp.  
2536–2540. 
12. Y. Liu, C. Comaniciu, and H. Man, “A Bayesian 
game approach for intrusion detection in wireless 
ad  hoc  networks,”   in Proc.  ACM  Game Nets, 
p. 4. 
13. L. Chen and J. Leneutre, “Selfishness, not always a 
nightmare: Modeling selfish MAC behaviors in 
wireless mobile ad hoc networks,” in Proc. IEEE 
ICDCS, 2007, p. 16. 
14. S. Buchegger and J. Boudec, “A robust reputation 
system for P2P and mobile ad-hoc networks,” in 
Proc. 2nd Workshop Econ. Peer-to-Peer Syst., 2004, 
pp. 403–410. 
15. P. Michiardi and R. Molva, “CORE: A collaborative 
reputation mechanism to enforce player cooperation 
in mobile ad hoc networks,” in Proc. Commun. 
Multimedia Secur., 2002, pp. 107–121. 
16. S. Buchegger and J. Boudec, “Performance 
analysis of the confidant protocol,” in Proc. ACM 
MobiHoc, 2002, pp. 226–236. 
17. S. Bansal and M. Baker, “Observation-based 
cooperation enforcement in ad hoc networks,” 
Stanford Univ. Press, Stanford, CA, Tech. Rep. 
(CoRRcs.NI/0307012), 2003. 
18. F. Li and J. Wu, “Mobility reduces uncertainty in 
MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKs,” in Proc. IEEE 
INFOCOM, 2007, pp. 1946–1954. 
19. Josang, R. Ismail, and C. Boyd, “A survey of trust 
and reputation systems for online service provision,” 
Decis. Support Syst., vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 618–644, 
Mar. 2007. 
20. F. Li, A. Srinivasan, M. Lu, and J. Wu, “Uncertainty 
mitigation for utility-oriented routing in MOBILE AD 
HOC NETWORKs,” in Proc. IEEE GLOBECOM, 
2007, pp. 427–431. 
21. F. Li and J. Wu, “Hit and run: A Bayesian game 
between malicious and regular players in mobile 
networks,”      in     Proc.    IEEE     SECON,     2008,  
pp. 432–440. 
22. V. Srinivasan, P. Nuggehalli, C. Chiasserini, and R. 
Rao, “Cooperation in wireless ad hoc networks,” in 
Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2003, pp. 808–817. 
23. E. Altman, A. Kherani, P. Michiardi, and R. Molva, 
“Non-cooperative forwarding in ad hoc networks,” 
INRIA, Sophia-Antipolis, France, Tech. Rep. RR-
5116, 2004. 
24. S. Marti, T. J. Giuli, K. Lai, and M. Baker, “Mitigating 
routing misbehaviour in mobile ad hoc networks,” in 
Proc. ACM MobiCom, 2000, pp. 255–265. 
25. W. Hsu, T. Spyropoulos, K. Psounis, and A. Helmy, 
“Modeling timevariant user mobility in wireless 
mobile networks,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2007, 
pp. 758–766. 
26. Feng Li, Yinying Yang, Jie Wu,” Attack and Flee: 
Game-Theory-Based Analysis on Interactions 
among Nodes in MANETs’, in Proc. IEEE. 
 
   
 
 
  
  
 
   
 
  
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
  
  
  
 V
ol
um
e 
X
III
  
Is
su
e 
III
  
V
er
sio
n 
I 
2
  
 
(
DDDD
)
© 2013   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
Y
e
a
r
01
3
2
  
 
   
 
  32
E
Multi Attacker Collision Analysis in MANETs using Conditional likilihood
 
   
  
 
 
Global Journals Inc. (US)
 
Guidelines Handbook
  
www.GlobalJournals.org
 
